Analytic study of the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya and its schools.

Efter du er vågnet svedende med et hamrende hjerte, og efter du pludselig har indset, at du i virkeligheden ikke er i fare, men at du faktisk ligger sikkert i din seng, kan det være svært at forstå, hvordan du blot få sekunder tidligere var overbevist om, at du var ved at blive nedtrampet af en flok enhjørninger. Hvorfor har vi disse livagtige hallucinationer, når vi sover, og hvorfor, uanset hvor underlige de er, tror vi stadig, at vi er vågne, (...) når vi drømmer? Det meste, vi ved om drømme, stammer fra de beretninger, vi giver, når vi er vågnet. Der findes ingen teknologi, som kan se direkte ind i vores drømme og fortælle os, hvad de handler om. For mange af os er det en lettelse, at vores drømme i det mindste fortsat er private. Dog kan vi få indsigt i drømme ved at studere sovende personers fysiologi, imens de sover. Den drømmende hjerne og krop kan analyseres og sammenholdes med de efterfølgende beretninger om drømmene. (shrink)

The contents of the sixth book of Ennius' Annals have recently become a matter of dispute. Ever since Columna's edition it had been assumed that the book was entirely given over to the story of the war against king Pyrrhus . That view was based on the anecdote told by Quintilian 6.3.6, that Cicero, asked to say something de Sexto Annali, a witness in a law case, replied: ‘Quis potis ingentis oras euoluere belli’. It seems as good as certain that (...) this was the first line of Book VI, and belli was taken by all as referring to the Pyrrhus war. According to Dr T. Cornell, however, ‘unrolling the mighty scroll of war’ means that the poet is now going to describe warfare on the grand scale, thus setting the sequence of the third Samnite War, the Pyrrhus War, and the second Punic War against the minor wars described in the first five books. I doubt if Ennius would have felt that the early Latin war with the story of Lake Regillus, the capture of Veii, the Allia, the fall of Rome to the Gauls, and the second Samnite war were minor wars; but I am certain that bellum in the singular, except in contrast to the notion of pax, cannot refer to war in a general sense, covering a plurality of wars. (shrink)

Introduction. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Préface. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Idealization and the Defence of Economics: Notes Toward a History. Part I: General Observations on Idealization in Economics. Kevin D. HOOVER: Six Queries about Idealization in an Empirical Context. Bernard WALLISER: Three Generalization Processes for Economic Models. Steven COOK and David HENDRY: The Theory of Reduction in Econometrics. Maarten C.W. JANSSEN: Economic Models and Their Applications. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA: Idealization and Empirical Adequacy in Economic (...) Theory. Izabella NOWAKOWA and Leszek NOWAK: On Correspondence between Economic Theories. Uskali MÄKI: Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics. Part II: Case Studies of Idealization in Economics. Nancy CARTWRIGHT: Mill and Menger: Ideal Elements and Stable Tendencies. Wolfgang BALZER: Exchange Versus Influence: A Case of Idealization. Kees COOLS, Bert HAMMINGA, Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Truth Approximation by Concretization in Capital Structure Theory. Daniel M. HAUSMAN: Paul Samuelson as Dr. Frankenstein: When an Idealization Runs Amuck. Hugo A. KEUZENKAMP: What if an Idealization is Problematic? The Case of the Homogeneity Condition in Consumer Demand. Werner DIEDERICH: Nowak on Explanation and Idealization in Marx's 'Capital'. Gérard JORLAND: Idealization and Transformation. Jack BIRNER: Idealizations and Theory Development in Economics. Some History and Logic of the Logic Discovery. Discussions. Leszek NOWAK: The Idealizational Methodology and Economics. Replies to Diederich, Hoover, Janssen, Jorland and Mäki. (shrink)

Den offentlige beslutningsprosessen i bioetiske spørsmål i Norge preges av stor bruk av etiske komiteer. I denne artikkelen reiser jeg spørsmålet om hvordan denne bruken kan begrunnes. Mens en god offentlig prosess krever at det finnes organer som tar seg av nemndenes drøftende og informasjonsgivende funksjon, er det mindre sikkert hvorvidt vi trenger deres rådgivende funksjon, som det til en viss grad er mulig å skille fra de to andre funksjonene. Nemndenes rådgivende funksjon kjennetegnes ved at deres råd gis en (...) spesiell vekt i høringsrunder, uavhengig av argumentene bak rådene, og slik må det også være hvis man skal ha rådgivende nemnder overhodet. Men det er uklart hva som rettferdiggjør at nemndenes råd gis spesiell vekt.Jeg ser på to måter å svare på dette spørsmålet på, enten med utgangspunkt i en moralsk epistemologi som sannsynliggjør at nemndene finner moralsk riktige svar, eller med utgangspunkt i en teori om politisk legitimitet som tilsier at nemndenes konklusjoner har politisk legitimitet. Jeg drøfter og forkaster to former for moralsk epistemologi; én som ser på nemnder som en samling etikkeksperter som kan resonnere seg frem til riktig svar, og én som ser på nemnder som en samling vismenn med spesiell moralsk innsikt. Mer plausibelt er en mellomløsning, som ser på nemndsmedlemmene som de kompetente dommere i en reflektiv likevektprosess. I en slik prosess spiller imidlertid skjønnsvurderinger en uunngåelig rolle, og jeg argumenterer for at beslutninger basert på subjektive skjønnsvurderinger ikke vil være politisk legitime. I den grad nemnder bidrar til politisk legitime beslutninger, er det mer fordi de bidrar til å oppdage løsninger som av uavhengige grunner har politisk legitimitet, enn at de selv gir slik legitimitet. (shrink)

I denne artikkelen drøfter vi hvordan norske forbrukeres holdninger til genmodifisert mat har endret seg gjennom årene. Allerede da genteknologi ble etablert som et eget forskningsfelt og utviklingsområde på 1980-tallet, viste den norske opinionen stor skepsis. Den norske lovgivningen tidlig på 1990-tallet utmerket seg også som den mest restriktive i Europa. Dette bildet endret seg ikke mye i løpet av 1990-tallet, mens opinionen i mange europeiske land i disse årene kom mer på linje med den norske. I hele denne perioden (...) var både forbrukeropinionen og lovgivningen i USA langt mer aksepterende enn i Europa, noe som ga seg utslag i en handelskonflikt som toppet seg med EU sitt moratorium for utsetting av genmodifiserte planter i 1999. I denne artikkelen stiller vi spørsmålet om norske forbrukeres holdninger til genmodifisert mat har endret seg de siste årene. Artikkelen viser at mellom 2002 og 2007 er det en voksende gruppe av forbrukere som ser ut til å akseptere genmodifiserte matvarer hvis det fører til en helse- eller miljøgevinst. Men til tross for dette så er nordmenn fremdeles skeptiske til genmodifisert mat. Det kan tolkes slik at genmodifisert mat ikke har ført til den nytten som ansees nødvendig for å ta den risikoen det innebærer å gjøre et betydelig skifte i matseddel. Matpatriotisme og en kulturell konservatisme når det gjelder skifte i matvaner bidrar også til å forklare den dominerende vente-og-se-holdningen. (shrink)

Dr Seuren's study deals with the problem of presenting an adequate model of grammatical description. The model he proposes conforms in its main outlines to the transformational generative grammar established by Chomsky, but differs in important respects. These mainly affect that part of Chomsky's syntactic component known as the 'base', which generates basic or 'deep' structures. In the model of the base proposed here two main constituents are distinguished for every deep structure representation of a sentence, vis-a-vis the operators and (...) the nucleus. The deep structure of a sentence is thus seen to be very similar to the logical structure of a proposition. The arguments given in support of this analysis are based on mainly on considerations of simplicity and semantic adequacy. (shrink)

Artikkelen drøfter hvordan vi bør forstå kravet om likhet for loven i Grl. § 98. Vi spør hvorvidt en appell til likhet for loven har selvstendig normativ funksjon, og eventuelt hvorfor og hva som kreves for at likhetskravets skal realiseres. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i et behov for avklaring av disse spørsmålene, da verken forarbeidene til grunnlovsrevisjonen i 2014 eller etterfølgende rettsvitenskapelig litteratur, i særlig grad avklarer hva likhet for loven betyr. Vi utvikler en teori om at likhetsprinsippet i § 98 (...) er et grunnprinsipp for retten som fastlegger begrunnelsesbyrden ved utformingen av lov og annen regulering, og ved rettsanvendelsen. Likhetsprinsippet innebærer at likebehandling krever i seg selv ingen begrunnelse, mens ulikebehandling må kunne begrunnes i henhold til kravene i andre ledd. De to leddene i paragrafen er derfor etter vårt syn uatskillelige: Første ledd stadfester hva som er utgangspunktet, mens andre ledd presiserer hva som ikke regnes som relevante begrunnelser for ulikhet. Likhetskravet er dermed ikke et krav om likt utfall, men et krav om likeverdighet, som vi hevder er en konstitutiv verdi for verdien av politisk rettferdighet. Den forståelsen av likhetskravet i § 98 som vi utvikler, knytter første og andre ledd i § 98 sammen, og åpner for at også første ledd kan bli mer aktivt brukt av domstolene. (shrink)

In Chapter VI of his powerful study God and Other Minds Dr Alvin Plantinga deploys what—following a suggestion of mine—he calls ‘The Free Will Defence’. He presents his case there as a reaction to two earlier attempts to overcome that defence. I propose to take this chapter in Plantinga as my starting point here; and, as far as can be, to ignore, though not by that token to repudiate, those by now rather ancient earlier essays.

La decouverte par le Dr. E. A. Fellmann de l'exemplaire des Principia Mathematica de Newton ayant appartenu a Leibniz et contenant des notes marginales manuscrites (datant vraisemblablement de 1689), apporte un temoignage direct de la premiere reaction de Leibniz devant l'oeuvre du savant anglais. La presente edition met le document original entre les mains du lecteur, en l'accompagnant des notes et commentaires objectifs indispensables (en allemand et en francais). Le rapport de Leibniz a Newton a souvent ete envisage dans le (...) cadre de la facheuse querelle de priorite dans l'invention du calcul differentiel et integral. Or Leibniz, prenant connaissance des Principia, n'y voit pas un traite purement mathematique: refusant d'enteriner la scission entre la mecanique et les lois de la pensee, il se soucie avant tout d'etablir une fondation metaphysique pour la dynamique. Les Marginalia ont l'originalite de nous presenter, non pas un Leibniz adversaire ou rival, mais un Leibniz lecteur de Newton, dispose a tirer le meilleur parti d'un systeme qui aurait pu, a bien des egards, lui sembler etranger, comme le confirmera la systemisation ulterieure du concept de vis visa. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact that recent advances in clinical neurology, introspectionist psychology and neuroscience have upon the philosophical psycho?neural Identity Theory. Topics covered include (i) the nature and properties of phenomenal consciousness based on a study of the ?basic? visual field, i.e. that obtained in the complete dark, the Ganzfeld, and during recovery from occipital lobe injuries; (ii) the nature of the ?body?image? of neurology and its relation to the physical body; (iii) Descartes? error in choosing extension in space (...) as the criterion for distinguishing the physical and the mental; (iv) the technical distinction between sensing and perceiving; (v) why phenomenal Direct Realism is incorrect whereas epistemic DR and the representative theory are correct; (vi) the ontological and topological status of phenomenal space and physical space. This leads to considerations of the current ?binding problems? in neuroscience; the role of the brain mechanisms that construct the sensory fields of phenomenal consciousness; the ?homunculus? fallacy; the key difference between epistemic and non?epistemic perception as revealed by brain injury studies; and how the brain codes information, contrasting topological and vectorial coding, with particular reference to the binding problem. My conclusion is that the Identity Theory is incompatible with the scientific evidence from an integrated approach to modern introspectionist psychology, clinical neurology, and neuroscience. However, Cartesian Dualism is even more incompatible with the evidence. This leaves only two viable theories. The first is Bohr's theory of brain?consciousness complementarity. The second is the Broad?Price?Smythies theory of extension, which is a topological theory of the relation between phenomenal space and physical space. (shrink)

This collection of essays examines the ways in which disputes and controversies about the application of scientific knowledge are resolved. Four concrete examples of public controversy are considered in detail: the efficacy of Laetrile, the classification of homosexuality as a disease, the setting of safety standards in the workplace, and the utility of nuclear energy as a source of power. The essays in this volume show that debates about these cases are not confined to matters of empirical fact. Rather, as (...) is seen with most scientific and technical controversies, they focus on and are structured by complex ethical, economic, and political interests. Drs. Engelhardt and Caplan have brought together a distinguished group of scholars from the sciences and humanities, who sketch a theory of scientific controversy and attempt to provide recommendations about the ways in which both scientists and the public ought to seek more informed resolutions of highly contentious issues in science and technology. Scientific Controversies is offered as a contribution to the better understanding of the roles of both science and nonscientific interests in disputes and controversies pertaining to science and technology. (shrink)

Omfanget av helsepersonells reservasjonsrett har nylig vært gjenstand for debatt i Norge. Vi spør om leger bør ha reservasjonsrett ved utførelse og henvisning til assistert befruktning, og drøfter argumenter for og imot ved hjelp av et rammeverk med sju kriterier for vurdering av reservasjon. Reservasjonsrettens grunnleggende dilemma er hvordan to viktige hensyn, henholdsvis pasientens rett til behandling og hensynet til helsepersonellets moralske integritet, best kan ivaretas. Det argumenteres for at leger bør ha rett til å reservere seg mot å utføre, (...) assistere ved og henvise til assistert befruktning generelt hvis begrunnelsen er hensynet til befruktede eggs moralske verdi. Videre finner vi at leger også kan ha en moralsk rett til reservasjon mot å utføre, assistere ved og henvise til assistert befruktning for likekjønnede, men da på nærmere spesifiserte vilkår.Nøkkelord: reservasjonsrett, assistert befruktning, samvittighet, moralsk integritetEnglish summary: Should physicians have the right to conscientiously object to assisted reproduction?The extent of the healthcare worker's right to conscientious objection has recently been debated in Norway. This article asks whether physicians should have a right to conscientious objection to the performance of, and referral for, assisted reproduction, and discusses arguments for and against the same, utilizing a framework of seven criteria for the evaluation of conscientious objection. The fundamental dilemma of conscientious objection is how two important considerations can be reconciled: the patient's right to treatment, and the protection of the healthcare worker's moral integrity. It is argued that physicians should have the right to object to performing, assisting with, and referring for assisted reproduction generally when the objection is grounded in the moral value of the embryo. Furthermore, physicians may also have a moral right to object to performing, assisting with, and referring for assisted reproduction for same-sex couples, but only on conditions that are further specified. (shrink)

Artikkelen er en fenomenologisk og hermeneutisk betraktning av Trondheims minnepark for 22. juli-ofrene. Bakgrunnen ligger i et etisk moment av hermeneutisk selvkritikk, som utspilte seg i storsamfunnets reaksjoner på terroren, og som parken må sees i lys av. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i at flere av diktene som er slipt inn i minneparkens hvite betong, tematiserer behovet for mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse. Ved hjelp av kunstteoretikeren Bourriaud og filosofene Fichte og Hegel synliggjøres det hvordan dette temaet – mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse – kan sies å (...) være integrert i parkens helhetlige estetikk. Siste del drøfter ved hjelp av Gadamer hvordan anerkjennelse også er relevant for aktiviteten med å gå omkring og lese diktene i parken. Til sammen belyser artikkelen hvordan minneparken utgjør en sammenveving av det etiske og det estetiske, og hvordan ordet minne her har to betydninger. Med parken minnes vi ofrene for terroren i betydningen kollektiv hukommelse, eller in memoriam. Samtidig blir vi påminnet vår evne til å være i relasjon med andre mennesker, og til å vokse i relasjonelt samspill. Den siste betydningen er filosofisk, og spiller på betydningen gjenerindring. Nøkkelord: hermeneutisk selvkritikk, anerkjennelse, deltakelse, hverdagslighet, lesning English summary: "Becoming fully oneself by being seen." On the connection between ethics and aesthetics in Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims This article presents a phenomenological and hermeneutical consideration of Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims. The background evolves in an ethical and hermeneutical form of self-criticism, which emerged in Norway in the public reactions to the terror. The article observes the fact that several of the poems embedded in the white concrete of the Memorial Park promote the need for interpersonal recognition. Through considering ideas of Bourriaud, Fichte, and Hegel, the author demonstrates how this very theme of interpersonal recognition is integrated into the park's overall aesthetics. The author considers how recognition is also relevant to the activity of reading the poems in the park through evoking Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In sum, the article demonstrates how the Memorial Park constitutes a joining of the ethical and aesthetic dimensions and how the word memorial [Norwegian: minne] here gains two meanings. In the park we remember the victims of the terror in the sense of collective memory, or in memoriam. At the same time, we are reminded of our ability to be in relationship with other people and to grow in relational interaction. The latter sense is philosophical and draws on the meaning of recollection. Keywords: hermeneutical self-criticism, recognition, participation, everyday life, reading. (shrink)

Con un altero de filósofos contemporáneos y sus obras, el Dr. Mario Teodoro Ramírez Cobián se asoma al cambio del paradigma nomológico al sistémico, sin declararlo. Hablar de sistemas es hablar de relaciones, hablar de quiasmo es hablar del entrecruce entre lo natural y lo cultural; entre lo fenoménico y los productos humanos; entre el sujeto y el objeto; entre facultades y emociones... Enamorado de la estética y de las artes, Merleau- Ponty. Para llegar a estos hallazgos, este filósofo francés (...) analizado bajo la lupa de Mario Teodoro, se colocó al lado de la corporalidad que toma sus formas intensasen las percepciones y el juicio del gusto. El quiasmo (chiasmón, del griego), intermedio. En retórica es el entrecruce de dos estructuras paralelas donde la segunda invierte el orden de la primera. Quiasmo también es el vínculo entre el lector y el texto o herme-néutica. Como historicista y fenomenólogo, llega al holon, a la gestalt, a la vida la creación y auto creación que revela el determinismo, del azar. Merleau-Ponty toma el lado de la corporalidad que construye y destruye con el quiasmo semiótico, entre cruza sentido, y al arte cuyo centro está en todas partes y su circunferencia en ninguno. Considera el cuerpo como la potencia que ve, toca, oye; de lo consciente e inconsciente. Leer los escritos de Mario Teodoro sobre Merleau- Ponty nos enseña el holon, el vitalismo histórico, lo consciente e inconsciente. (shrink)

The recent revival of scholarly interest in Suetonius provides a good occasion to emend a long-standing crux in Joannes Lydus' description of Suetonius' dedication of his Vitae Caesarum to his friend the praetorian prefect Septicius Clarus. The codex unicus Caseolinus has Τράγκυλλος τοίνυν τος τν Καισάων βίους ν γράμμασιν † ποτίνων † Σεπτικί, ς ν παρχος τν πραιτωριανν σπειρν πì ατο. The conjectures ποτείνων by J. D. Fuss and ποτείνων by I. Bekker do little to improve the sense, and although (...) W. Kroll's προτείνων gives the meaning required by the context , προ- would not easily have been misread as πο-. For ποτίνων read νατείνων. For parallels compare BGU ii , 613.3–4 'Ανέτινα βιβλ[ίδι]α τλαμπροτάτ [γεμόνι] in a papyrus from the reign of Antoninus Pius cited by LSJ, and several other passages, most of which I owe to the supplement to Preisigke and Kiessling's Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden and to Dr Francisco R. Adrados of the Diccionario Griego-Español: Sammelbuch x , 10527.5–7 ['Ανέτε]ινά σοι, κ[ύριε,]…ναφόρ[ιον… of a.d. 152–3, P. Fouad iii , 26.5–10 , 8252.5–10) Ο νέτινάσυ τ κυρί βιβλιδίου…ντίγραφον πέταξα of a.d. 157–9, P. Oslo. iii , 80.21 ο νέτιναν βιβλιδί[ου…written sometime after March 7, a.d. 161, Sammelbuch iv 7472.3 'Ανέτεινά [σοι, κύριε πίτροπε, βιβλείδιον of a.d. 164, Sammelbuch vi.3 9339.24–7 13.5–7) ο νετείναμεν τ [κρατίσ τρχιερε O]λπί Σερηνιαν βιβλιδίου…[…] ντίγραφον πετάξαμεν from a.d. 178 or a little later, P. Mich. xii 616.13–14 τ δίκαιά μου βιβλειδί νγράψασ νέτεινα Νεμεσιαν πωσ τα[]τα διαπέμψηται[τ ]πιτρόπ from ca. a.d. 182, P. Cornell 14.2–4 ο νέτει[να τ κρατίστ πιστρ]ατηγ Κλαυδί [Ξενοφντι βιβλδίο]υ from a.d. 180–92, Wilcken, Chrestomathie 461.3–5 О[ νέ]τεινα τ λαμπροτάτ [γεμόνΚ]υίντω[ι] Μαικίωι λαιτίωι βιβλιδίου…ντίγραφον [ποτάξασ] from the beginning of the third century, and Sammelbuch v , 8246.3–4 α συνηγερούμεναι λιβέλλον νέτιναν π τν παρχον ξουσίαν from a.d. 340. (shrink)

In C.Q. xxiii. 2 Dr. C. M. Bowra examined the Ennian phrases in the Aeneid which Virgil adopted but transformed. Bowra, whose object was to investigate the reasons which led Virgil to make slight changes in these echoes, naturally had nothing to say about those borrowings which remained unaltered in Virgil. Of these, perhaps the most striking is the allusion to Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator in v. 846 above. The following points can be noted about the line: 1. It is (...) not a subconscious, or apparently purposeless, reminiscence of familiar words, a habit of which the best-known example is Aen. vi. 460, invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi, cf. Cat. lxvi. 39. (shrink)

I Norge er ikke surrogati tillatt, og myndighetene fraråder norske statsborgere å benytte seg av surrogati i utlandet. I denne artikkelen fokuserer vi på kommersiell gestational surrogati og stiller spørsmålet: Bør man tillate at norske statsborgere benytter seg av surrogati i India? De etiske problemstillingene rundt surrogati er mange og sammensatte og blir spesielt utfordrende når tjenesten tilbys i et land med store kulturelle og økonomiske forskjeller både internt og i forhold til Norge. Vi baserer analysen og drøftingen av dette (...) etisk utfordrende spørsmålet på Beauchamps og Childress sin veletablerte metodiske tilnærming innen biomedisinsk etikk. Vi anvender de fire allmennmoralske prinsipper: respekt for autonomi, velgjørenhet, ikke-skade og rettferdighet på sakskomplekset for å synliggjøre spenningene involvert i dette etiske dilemmaet. Med full bevissthet om at det ikke finnes noen lettvinte og omkostningsfrie løsninger på dilemmaer generelt og dette spesielt, konkluderer vi med at interessene til de berørte parter, og spesielt surrogatmødrenes, kan bli bedre ivaretatt om surrogati tillates under omfattende reguleringer. Dersom man velger å gjøre praksisen illegal, vil man også miste mulighetene til å påvirke prosessen og sikre rettighetene til de involverte partene.Nøkkelord: surrogati, Norge–India, utnyttelse, autonomi, regulering av prosessenEnglish summary: Should Norwegian citizens be permitted to use surrogacy in India?Surrogacy is not permitted in Norway, and the government strongly advises against Norwegian citizens travelling abroad to have children through the use of the surrogacy industry. In this article, we focus on commercial gestational surrogacy and debate the question: Should Norwegian citizens be permitted to use surrogacy in India? The ethical concerns regarding surrogacy are complex and are especially challenging when the service is offered in a country with big cultural and economic differences both internal and in comparison to Norway. We base our analysis of this ethical, challenging question on Beauchamp’s and Childress’s well-established approach within biomedical ethics. We apply the four principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice to shed light on the conflicts of interests in this ethical dilemma. With full awareness that there are no simple and correct solutions to dilemmas in general and on this issue, especially, our conclusion is that the interests of the involved parties, and especially those of the surrogate mothers, might be better attended to if surrogacy is allowed with extensive regulations. If this practice is made illegal, the opportunity to influence the process and secure the rights of the involved parties is lost. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:460 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY accurate understanding of the mind of Aristotle. Nifo's shift on the question of Aristotle and immortality thus represents a noteworthy chapter in the history of Renaissance Aristotelianism.6x EDWAKDP. MAHONEY Duke University 6x I should like to thank the United States Government for a Fulbright fellowship during 1962-1963; the National Foundation for the Humanities for a fellowship during 1968-1969; and the Duke UniversityResearch Council for grants (...) for microfilms. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF JACOB LOEWENBERG Compiled by Edwin S. Budge It is hoped that all of Professor Loewenberg's published writings, exclusive of his many book reviews, are listed herein. His unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Genesis of Hegel's Dialectical Method" (1911), is available on loan from Harvard University, although the "gist" of this, as Dr. Loewenberg has indicated, may be found in the introduction to the first item cited in the bibliography. Dr. Loewenberg, it might be added, also translated a short work by Gilbert Chinard, France for the Soldier (Berkeley: University of California, 1918), and quite likely was consulted by his wife Kate in the course of her translation of Emile Meyerson's Identity and Reality (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930; reprinted by Dover, 1962, and Peter Smith, 1963). Jacob Loewenberg's personal papers are in the possession of his daughter, Mrs. Jeannot Nyles, of Berkeley, California. 1912 1916 BIBLIOGRAPHYOF THE WRITINGSOF JACOBLOEWENBERG "Vorwort," pp. v-vi; "Einleitung: 'Die jugendlichen Denkversuche Hegels'," pp. vii-xxii; in Hegels Entwiir/e zur Enzyklopiidie und Propiideutik nach den Handschri/ten der Harvard-Universitiit. Mit einer Handschri[tprobe. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Herausgegeben yon Dr. J. Ltwenberg. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, I912. xxiv, 59 pp. (Hegel-Archiv. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson. Band I, Heft 1.) "Interpretation as a Self-Representative Process," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May, 1916), 420-423. "Mysticism and Idealism," University o/ California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1916), 72-91. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, December 10, 1915." 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 461 "The Spirit of Hegel's Philosophy," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (July, 1916), 373-393. "The Teachings of Royce," The California Alumni Fortnightly, Vol. IX, No. 14 (September 30, 1916), 216-217. "Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (July, 1917), 215-236. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 23, 1917." "Josiah Royce: Interpreter of American Problems," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1917), 39-47. "The Prophetic Songs of Swinburne," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XX, No. 10anuary, 1918), 106-115. "Preface," pp. vii-xii in Lectures on Modern Idealism. By Josiah Royce. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. 259. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) "Ethics and the War," Mills Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 4 0anuary, 1919), 6-9. "An address delivered at Mills College, October 18, 1918." "Multiplicity and the Social Order," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XII, No. 2 (April, 1919), 137-164. "President Wilson's Americanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January, 1919), 1-15. "Introduction," pp. 3-37 in Fugitive Essays; with an Introduction by Dr. J. Loewenberg. By Josiah Royce. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Pp. 429. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) "Philosophy and Humanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIH, No. 3 (July, 1921), 298-318. "Read before the Kosmos Club of the University of California, April 4, 1921." "The Apotheosis of Mind in Modern Idealism," The Philosophical Reviewj Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (May, 1922), 215-236. "A fragment of a larger essay." "The Idea of Mutability in Literature," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1922), 129-151. "The Metaphysics of Critical Realism," pp. 167-194 in Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by George P. Adams and J. Loewenberg. 462 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Berkeley: University of California, 1923, Pp. 224. (University of California Publieations in Philosophy, VoL IV.) Read before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, March 30, 1923. "'The Metaphysics of Modern Scepticism," The Philosophical... (shrink)

Description: This scholarly work of Dr S.M.S. Chari's deals with the critical review of seventeen philosophical systems as presented in an important philosophical treatise of the thirteenth century titled Paramata-bhanga contributed by Vedanta Desika, an illustrious successor to Ramanuja, who is the chief exponent of Visistadvaita Vedanta. The main objective of Paramata-bhanga is to establish that Visistadvaita is a sound system of philosophy as compared to the several other Non-Vedic as well as Vedic schools and also Vedanta schools developed by (...) Samkara, Yadavaprakasa, Bhaskara, and other exponents of the post-Ramanuja period. The original text written in Manipravala (a mixture of Tamil and Sanskrit) language contains, besides a brief account of the fundamental doctrines of Visistadvaita. The schools covered are Carvaka, Buddhism, Jainism, Sankhya, Yoga, Vaisesika, Nyaya, Purvamimamsa, Pasupata, Sabdabrahma-vivartavada, and Advaita Vedanta. Among the extant philosophical classics, Paramata-bhanga is a unique work. Realizing the importance of the Paramata-bhanga for the comparative study of Indian philosophy, late Dr Chari tried to give a lucid exposition of this treatise in English. This volume, which is the first of its kind, would be invaluable for students of Indian philosophy in general and Visistadvaita in particular. (shrink)

1. Introduction. Sources of difficulty in the investigation.–II. Dr. Monro′s pitch theory. The passage in Heraclides. Supplementary evidence from the Problems.–III. Prof. Macran′s theory. Evidence against this theory. Prof. Macran′s answer to this evidence. Further objections. Criticism of the evidence in favour of Prof. Macran′s theory.–IV. Prof. Cook-Wilson′s theory. Platonic and Aristotelian evidence against Dr. Monro. Objections to this theory.–V. Recapitulation. Statement of the antinomies in the evidence.–VI. Conclusion. The nucleus of certainty. The Greek, as contrasted with the modern, musical (...) sense. (shrink)

This article analyzes the relationship between Van Gogh and two of his doctors, Dr. Rey and Dr. Gachet, whose portraits he painted, by comparing their rapport with the sick painter and vice versa. Van Gogh the patient/artist—presented here as a case study—enables us to examine not only his projections but the counter-projections of his doctors, whether in writing (Dr. Rey) or in painting (Dr. Gachet), and to explore the psychological and ethical tensions these projections give rise to. Van Gogh's portraits (...) of the two doctors offer two contrastive models: estrangement vis-à-vis “doubling” and symbiosis. Whereas Dr. Rey catered for Van Gogh's maternal needs and misunderstood his artistic needs, Dr. Gachet identified with his patient's talent and drew his face (death mask) after his suicide. The central ethical question that arises from the analysis of Van Gogh's relationship with his two doctors is whether we can extend our moral judgments beyond the cultural bounds of a specific historical context. (shrink)

Moderne teknologi gir fantastiske muligheter for menneskelig formering. Mange som tidligere ikke kunne få barn, eller som fikk syke barn, kan nå hjelpes. Samtidig reiser mulighetene en rekke vanskelige moralske spørsmål, som ikke har enkle svar – ofte fordi de bunner i grunnleggende etiske motsetninger. Denne artikkelen gir en kort oversikt over de mulighetene som tre typer teknologier gir: assisterende, seleksjonsfremmende og egenskapsendrende teknologier. Deretter peker den på noen av de viktige moralske spørsmålene som disse teknologiene reiser i betydningen «Hvordan (...) bør teknologiene brukes»? Så stilles spørsmålet: Hvordan skal vi begrunne bruken? Dette spørsmålet peker på en rekke grunnleggende etiske utfordringer. Det er disse utfordringene som gjør at de moralske spørsmålene sjelden finner solide og stabile svar, men til stadighet blusser opp i til dels heftige offentlige debatter. I tillegg løfter artikkelen frem flere moralske spørsmål som er glemt eller gjemt. Spørsmålene som vi ikke stiller kan ofte fortelle oss like mye om oss selv og våre verdier, som de spørsmålene som drøftes eksplisitt. De moralske spørsmålene – samt de underliggende etiske utfordringene og de glemte spørsmålene – kan forklare hvorfor debattene ofte står på stedet hvil, og hva vi må jobbe med for å komme videre i drøftingene av moderne reproduksjonsteknologi. Vi synes å være teknologiske helter som er fremragende på teknikk, men elendige på etikk. Målet er å forhindre at vi blir tragiske helter som går til grunne på våre beste egenskaper. Nøkkelord: reproduksjonsteknologi, assistert reproduksjon, invitro-fertilisering, fosterdiagnostikk, genredigering, sortering, abortEnglish summary: Ethical challenges with newer reproductive technology Modern technologies provide fascinating opportunities for human reproduction. Many persons previously infertile, or who risked having diseased children, can now have healthy children. At the same time, these technological opportunities also raise a wide range of moral questions, which rarely have easy answers. One reason for this is that they are based on profound ethical challenges. This article sets out to give a short overview of three types of technologies: assisting, selective, and characteristic-changing technologies. It goes on to highlight some of the important moral questions raised by these technologies. The third part addresses the basic ethical challenges lurking behind the moral questions and debates. The fourth part addresses some forgotten or hidden questions, arguing that these are telling and important. The article ends with arguing that many of the basic ethical challenges and the unaddressed questions can explain why debates on reproductive technologies are so heated and static. We appear to have become technological giants, but ethical infants. Accordingly, we should try to avoid becoming tragic heroes succumbing to our very best abilities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that this examination and appreciation for the shift to abductive reasoning should be extended to the intersection of neuroscience and novel brain-computer interfaces too. This paper highlights the implications of applying abductive reasoning to personalized implantable neurotechnologies. Then, it explores whether abductive reasoning is sufficient to justify insurance coverage for devices absent widespread clinical trials, which are better applied to one-size-fits-all treatments. INTRODUCTION In contrast to the classic model of randomized-control trials, often with a large number of (...) subjects enrolled, precision medicine attempts to optimize therapeutic outcomes by focusing on the individual.[i] A recent publication highlights the strengths and weakness of both traditional evidence-based medicine and precision medicine.[ii] Plus, it outlines a tension in the shift from evidence-based medicine’s inductive reasoning style (the collection of data to postulate general theories) to precision medicine’s abductive reasoning style (the generation of an idea from the limited data available).[iii] The paper’s main example is the application of precision medicine for the treatment of cancer.[iv] I argue that this examination and appreciation for the shift to abductive reasoning should be extended to the intersection of neuroscience and novel brain-computer interfaces too. As the name suggests, brain-computer interfaces are a significant advancement in neurotechnology that directly connects someone’s brain to external or implanted devices.[v] Among the various kinds of brain-computer interfaces, adaptive deep brain stimulation devices require numerous personalized adjustments to their settings during the implantation and computation stages in order to provide adequate relief to patients with treatment-resistant disorders. What makes these devices unique is how adaptive deep brain stimulation integrates a sensory component to initiate the stimulation. While not commonly at the level of sophistication as self-supervising or generative large language models,[vi] they currently allow for a semi-autonomous form of neuromodulation. This paper highlights the implications of applying abductive reasoning to personalized implantable neurotechnologies. Then, it explores whether abductive reasoning is sufficient to justify insurance coverage for devices absent widespread clinical trials, which are better applied to one-size-fits-all treatments.[vii] ANALYSIS I. The State of Precision Medicine in Oncology and the Epistemological Shift While a thorough overview of precision medicine for the treatment of cancer is beyond the scope of this article, its practice can be roughly summarized as identifying clinically significant characteristics a patient possesses (e.g., genetic traits) to land on a specialized treatment option that, theoretically, should benefit the patient the most.[viii] However, in such a practice of stratification patients fall into smaller and smaller populations and the quality of evidence that can be applied to anyone outside these decreases in turn.[ix] As inductive logic helps to articulate, the greater the number of patients that respond to a particular therapy the higher the probability of its efficacy. By straying from this logical framework, precision medicine opens the treatment of cancer to more uncertainty about the validity of these approaches to the resulting disease subcategories.[x] Thus, while contemporary medical practices explicitly describe some treatments as “personalized”, they ought not be viewed as inherently better founded than other therapies.[xi] A relevant contemporary case of precision medicine out of Norway focuses on the care of a patient with cancer between the ventricles of the heart and esophagus, which had failed to respond to the standard regimen of therapies over four years.[xii] In a last-ditch effort, the patient elected to pay out-of-pocket for an experimental immunotherapy (nivolumab) at a private hospital. He experienced marked improvements and a reduction in the size of the tumor. Understandably, the patient tried to pursue further rounds of nivolumab at a public hospital. However, the hospital initially declined to pay for it given the “lack of evidence from randomised clinical trials for this drug relating to this [patient’s] condition.”[xiii] In rebuttal to this claim, the patient countered that he was actually similar to a subpopulation of patients who responded in “open‐label, single arm, phase 2 studies on another immune therapy drug” (pembrolizumab).[xiv] Given this interpretation of the prior studies and the patient’s response, further rounds of nivolumab were approved. Had the patient not had improvements in the tumor’s size following a round of nivolumab, then pembrolizumab’s prior empirical evidence in isolation would have been insufficient, inductively speaking, to justify his continued use of nivolumab.[xv] The case demonstrates a shift in reasoning from the traditional induction to abduction. The phenomenon of ‘cancer improvement’ is considered causally linked to nivolumab and its underlying physiological mechanisms.[xvi] However, “the weakness of abductions is that there may always be some other better, unknown explanation for an effect. The patient may for example belong to a special subgroup that spontaneously improves, or the change may be a placebo effect. This does not mean, however, that abductive inferences cannot be strong or reasonable, in the sense that they can make a conclusion probable.”[xvii] To demonstrate the limitations of relying on the abductive standard in isolation, commentators have pointed out that side effects in precision medicine are hard to rule out as being related to the initial intervention itself unless trends from a group of patients are taken into consideration.[xviii] As artificial intelligence (AI) assists the development of precision medicine for oncology, this uncertainty ought to be taken into consideration. The implementation of AI has been crucial to the development of precision medicine by providing a way to combine large patient datasets or a single patient with a large number of unique variables with machine learning to recommend matches based on statistics and probability of success upon which practitioners can base medical recommendations.[xix] The AI is usually not establishing a causal relationship[xx] – it is predicting. So, as AI bleeds into medical devices, like brain-computer interfaces, the same cautions about using abductive reasoning alone should be carried over. II. Responsive Neurostimulation, AI, and Personalized Medicine Like precision medicine in cancer treatment, computer-brain interface technology similarly focuses on the individual patient through personalized settings. In order to properly expose the intersection of AI, precision medicine, abductive reasoning, and implantable neurotechnologies, the descriptions of adaptive deep brain stimulation systems need to deepen.[xxi] As a broad summary of adaptive deep brain stimulation, to provide a patient with the therapeutic stimulation, a neural signal, typically referred to as a local field potential,[xxii] must first be detected and then interpreted by the device. The main adaptive deep brain stimulation device with premarket approval, the NeuroPace Responsive Neurostimulation system, is used to treat epilepsy by detecting and storing “programmer-defined phenomena.”[xxiii] Providers can optimize the detection settings of the device to align with the patient’s unique electrographic seizures as well as personalize the reacting stimulation’s parameters.[xxiv] The provider adjusts the technology based on trial and error. One day machine learning algorithms will be able to regularly aid this process in myriad ways, such as by identifying the specific stimulation settings a patient may respond to ahead of time based on their electrophysiological signatures.[xxv] Either way, with AI or programmers, adaptive neurostimulation technologies are individualized and therefore operate in line with precision medicine rather than standard treatments based on large clinical trials. Contemporary neurostimulation devices are not usually sophisticated enough to be prominent in AI discussions where the topics of neural networks, deep learning, generative models, and self-attention dominate the conversation. However, implantable high-density electrocorticography arrays (a much more sensitive version than adaptive deep brain stimulation systems use) have been used in combination with neural networks to help patients with neurologic deficits from a prior stroke “speak” through a virtual avatar.[xxvi] In some experimental situations, algorithms are optimizing stimulation parameters with increasing levels of independence.[xxvii] An example of neurostimulation that is analogous to the use of nivolumab in Norway surrounds a patient in the United States who was experiencing both treatment-resistant OCD and temporal lobe epilepsy.[xxviii]Given the refractory nature of her epilepsy, implantation of an adaptive deep brain stimulation system was indicated. As a form of experimental therapy, her treatment-resistant OCD was also indicated for the off-label use of an adaptive deep brain stimulation set-up. Another deep brain stimulation lead, other than the one implanted for epilepsy, was placed in the patient’s right nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum region given the correlation these nuclei had with OCD symptoms in prior research. Following this, the patient underwent “1) ambulatory, patient-initiated magnet-swipe storage of data during moments of obsessive thoughts; (2) lab-based, naturalistic provocation of OCD-related distress (naturalistic provocation task); and (3) lab-based, VR [virtual reality] provocation of OCD-related distress (VR provocation task).”[xxix] Such signals were used to identify when to deliver the therapeutic stimulation in order to counter the OCD symptoms. Thankfully, following the procedure and calibration the patient exhibited marked improvements in their OCD symptoms and recently shared her results publicly.[xxx] In both cases, there is a similar level of abductive justification for the efficacy of the delivered therapy. In the case study in which the patient was treated with adaptive deep brain stimulation, they at least had their neural activity tested in various settings to determine the optimum parameters for treatment to avoid them being based on guesswork. Additionally, the adaptive deep brain stimulation lead was already placed before the calibration trials were conducted, meaning that the patient had already taken on the bulk of the procedural risk before the efficacy could be determined. Such an efficacy test could have been replicated in the first patient’s cancer treatment, had it been biopsied and tested against the remaining immunotherapies in vitro. Yet, in the case of cancer with few options, one previous dose of a drug that appeared to work on the patient may justify further doses. However, as the Norwegian case presents, corroboration with known responses to a similar drug (from a clinical trial) could be helpful to validate the treatment strategy. (It should be noted that both patients were resigned to these last resort options regardless of the efficacy of treatment.) There are some elements of inductive logic seen with adaptive deep brain stimulation research in general. For example, abductively the focus could be that patient X’s stimulation parameters are different from patient Y’s and patient Z’s. In contrast, when grouped as subjects who obtained personalized stimulation, patients X, Y, and Z demonstrate an inductive aspect to this approach’s safety and/or efficacy. The OCD case holds plenty of abductive characteristics in line with precision medicine’s approach to treating cancer and as more individuals try the method, there will be additional data. With the gradual integration of AI into brain-computer interfaces in the name of efficacy, this reliance on abduction will continue, if not grow, over time. Moving forward, if a responsive deep brain stimulation treatment is novel and individualized (like the dose of nivolumab) and there is some other suggestion of efficacy (like clinical similarities to other patients in the literature), then it may justify insurance coverage for the investigative intervention, absent other unrelated reasons to deny it. III. Ethical Implications and Next Steps While AI’s use in oncology and neurology is not yet as prominent as its use in other fields (e.g., radiology), it appears to be on the horizon for both.[xxxi] AI can be found in both the functioning of the neurotechnologies as well as the implementation of precision medicine. The increasing use of AI may serve to further individualize both oncologic and neurological therapies. Given these implications and the handful of publications cited in this article, it is important to have a nuanced evaluation of how these treatments, which heavily rely on abductive justification, ought to be managed. The just use an abductive approach may be difficult as AI infused precision medicine is further pursued. At baseline, such technology relies on a level of advanced technology literacy among the general public and could exclude populations who lack access to basic technological infrastructure or know-how from participation.[xxxii] Even among nations with adequate infrastructure, as more patients seek out implantable neurotechnologies, which require robust healthcare resources, the market will favor patient populations that can afford this complex care.[xxxiii] If patients already have the means to pay for an initial dose/use of a precision medicine product out of pocket, should insurance providers be required to cover subsequent treatments?[xxxiv] That is, if a first dose of a cancer drug or a deep brain stimulator over its initial battery life is successful, patients may feel justified in having the costs of further treatments covered. The Norwegian patient’s experience implies there is a precedent for the idea that some public insurance companies ought to cover successful cancer therapies, however, insurance companies may not all see themselves as obligated to cover neurotechnologies that rely on personalized settings or that are based on precision/abductive research more than on clinical trials. CONCLUSION The fact that the cases outlined above rely on abductive style of reasoning implies that there may not be as strong a justification for coverage by insurance, as they are both experimental and individualized, when compared to the more traditional large clinical trials in which groups have the same or a standardized protocol (settings/doses). If a study is examining the efficacy of a treatment with a large cohort of patients or with different experimental groups/phases, insurance companies may conclude that the resulting symptom improvements are more likely to be coming from the devices themselves. A preference for inductive justification may take priority when ruling in favor of funding someone’s continued use of an implantable neurostimulator. There are further nuances to this discussion surrounding the classifications of these interventions as research versus clinical care that warrant future exploration, since such a distinction is more of a scale[xxxv] than binary and could have significant impacts on the “right-to-try” approach to experimental therapies in the United States.[xxxvi] Namely, given the inherent limitations of conducting large cohort trials for deep brain stimulation interventions on patients with neuropsychiatric disorders, surgically innovative frameworks that blend abductive and inductive methodologies, like with sham stimulation phases, have traditionally been used.[xxxvii] Similarly, for adaptive brain-computer interface systems, if there are no large clinical trials and instead only publications that demonstrate that something similar worked for someone else, then, in addition to the evidence that the first treatment/dose worked for the patient in question, the balance of reasoning would be valid and arguably justify insurance coverage. As precision approaches to neurotechnology become more common, frameworks for evaluating efficacy will be crucial both for insurance coverage and for clinical decision making. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This article was originally written as an assignment for Dr. Francis Shen’s “Bioethics & AI” course at Harvard’s Center for Bioethics. I would like to thank Dr. Shen for his comments as well as my colleagues in the Lázaro-Muñoz Lab for their feedback. - [i] Jonathan Kimmelman and Ian Tannock, “The Paradox of Precision Medicine,” Nature Reviews. Clinical Oncology 15, no. 6 (June 2018): 341–42, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41571-018-0016-0. [ii] Henrik Vogt and Bjørn Hofmann, “How Precision Medicine Changes Medical Epistemology: A Formative Case from Norway,” Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 28, no. 6 (December 2022): 1205–12, https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13649. [iii] David Barrett and Ahtisham Younas, “Induction, Deduction and Abduction,” Evidence-Based Nursing 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2024): 6–7, https://doi.org/10.1136/ebnurs-2023-103873. [iv] Vogt and Hofmann, “How Precision Medicine Changes Medical Epistemology,” 1208. [v] Wireko Andrew Awuah et al., “Bridging Minds and Machines: The Recent Advances of Brain-Computer Interfaces in Neurological and Neurosurgical Applications,” World Neurosurgery, May 22, 2024, S1878-8750(24)00867-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wneu.2024.05.104. [vi] Mark Riedl, “A Very Gentle Introduction to Large Language Models without the Hype,” Medium (blog), May 25, 2023, https://mark-riedl.medium.com/a-very-gentle-introduction-to-large-language-models-without-the-hype-5 f67941fa59e. [vii] David E. Burdette and Barbara E. Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” in Neurostimulation for Epilepsy, ed. Vikram R. Rao (Academic Press, 2023), 97–132, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-91702-5.00002-5. [viii] Kimmelman and Tannock, 2018. [ix] Kimmelman and Tannock, 2018. [x] Simon Lohse, “Mapping Uncertainty in Precision Medicine: A Systematic Scoping Review,” Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 29, no. 3 (April 2023): 554–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13789. [xi] Kimmelman and Tannock, “The Paradox of Precision Medicine.” [xii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xiii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xiv] Vogt and Hofmann, 1206. [xv] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xvi] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xvii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1207. [xviii] Vogt and Hofmann, 1210. [xix] Mehar Sahu et al., “Chapter Three - Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Precision Medicine: A Paradigm Shift in Big Data Analysis,” in Progress in Molecular Biology and Translational Science, ed. David B. Teplow, vol. 190, 1 vols., Precision Medicine (Academic Press, 2022), 57–100, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.pmbts.2022.03.002. [xx] Stefan Feuerriegel et al., “Causal Machine Learning for Predicting Treatment Outcomes,” Nature Medicine 30, no. 4 (April 2024): 958–68, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-024-02902-1. [xxi] Sunderland Baker et al., “Ethical Considerations in Closed Loop Deep Brain Stimulation,” Deep Brain Stimulation 3 (October 1, 2023): 8–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdbs.2023.11.001. [xxii] David Haslacher et al., “AI for Brain-Computer Interfaces,” 2024, 7, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.dnb.2024.02.003. [xxiii] Burdette and Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” 103–4; “Premarket Approval (PMA),” https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=P100026. [xxiv] Burdette and Swartz, “Chapter 4 - Responsive Neurostimulation,” 104. [xxv] Burdette and Swartz, 126. [xxvi] Sean L. Metzger et al., “A High-Performance Neuroprosthesis for Speech Decoding and Avatar Control,” Nature 620, no. 7976 (August 2023): 1037–46, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06443-4. 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Okun et al., “Deep Brain Stimulation in the Internal Capsule and Nucleus Accumbens Region: Responses Observed during Active and Sham Programming,” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 78, no. 3 (March 1, 2007): 310–14, https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2006.095315. (shrink)

The Ethical Responsibilities of Journalism Vis-à-Vis the Economics of News Earlier this year, Dr. Ryan Thomas reached out to me about a potential topic for the Trends section of the journal. He had...

The article starts from an examination of the authorship of the ‘Geleitwort’, the programmatic statement which appeared in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft when it came under new editors in 1904. Recently scholars have begun to view it as an important text by Max Weber recovered from obscurity, but this is a mistake. Examination of major contemporary works by Weber and Werner Sombart – the obvious co-author – as well as the first public disclosure of an entirely new MS. by Weber, (...) show that in all probability the text was drafted by Sombart and then revised fairly lightly by Weber. This story of a combined, if unequal, authorship leads into two broader seams of intellectual history: the relationship between Weber and Sombart, and the history of the Archiv as a journal. An unusual starting point thus casts fresh and unexpected light on some of the most central figures and episodes in German social science at the beginning of the 20th century, not least Weber's seminal essay on “Objectivity” in social science. ☆ This paper relies on intellectual interchange and the generosity of colleagues to a quite unusual degree. I note three particular debts: to Prof. Friedrich Lenger, for a copy of Sombart's important 1897 essay on ‘Social Scientific Journals’; to Prof. Guenther Roth for letter transcripts bearing on the Archiv from and to Edgar Jaffé, and for showing me in draft his ground-breaking work ‘Edgar Jaffé and Else von Richthofen: a biographical essay based on the family archive of Christopher Jeffrey’ [hereafter ‘Biographical Essay]; and to Dr. Edith Hanke and Prof. Rainer Lepsius (on behalf of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe). Dr. Hanke brought to my notice the existence of the MS. which I have called Weber's draft Editorial Notice (see §.IV below), and Prof. Lepsius then gave permission for me to see and to cite from this document. — Some abbreviations: AfSS for Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik; AfGS for Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik; Lebensbild for Marianne Weber, Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild [1926] (Tübingen, 1989); MWG for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe ed. Horst Baier et al. (Tübingen, 1984-). Letters by Weber within the MWG are cited as Briefe; ‘Nachlaß Max Weber’ for unpublished letters in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, VI. HA Nachlaß Max Weber. (shrink)

Read at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at St. Louis, Missouri, May 3, 1968. Some of the crucial thinking in this paper has been much influenced by J. C. Thornton’s brilliant “Religious Belief and ‘Reductionism’,”Sophia, vol. V, No. 3 , and by his “Reductionism—A Reply to Dr. Mascall”,Sophia, vol. VI, No. 2.

Hvad der sker i vores sovende hjerner, kan være et mareridt at tyde for en drømmeforsker. Og vi er desværre elendige til at huske det, når vi vågner. Heldigvis kan teknologien hjælpe med at løfte sløret for, hvad der foregår, mens vi ligger og trækker torsk i land. Nogle drømme er dybt bizarre. Andre fører til Nobelpriser. Og så er der dem, som bare er pinlige. De sidste vil vi nødig sende i en hjernescanner. Ifølge Melanie Gillespie Rosen, lysvågen filosof (...) ved Aarhus Universitet, handler de fleste drømme om noget så søvndyssende som arbejde. (shrink)

Ideen om at lovbrytere fortjener straff, må legges til grunn dersom vi skal kunne forstå og begrunne strafferetten i Norge og i andre rettsstater. Av noen teoretikere har dette kravet til fortjent straff blitt forstått som et negativt krav, som setter en begrensning på oppnåelsen av straffens formål. Straffen må da være «ikke ufortjent». I denne artikkelen argumenterer jeg for at en slik forståelse av fortjenesteideen er utilstrekkelig. Straff som fortjent må ansees som et positivt, selvstendig formål for strafferetten. Artikkelen (...) ser på norsk rettspraksis og lovforarbeider, og drøfter hvorfor det i norsk strafferett må legges til grunn at det er verdifullt å oppfylle lovbryterens fortjeneste. (shrink)

At profesjonsutøvere er ansvarlige og har ansvar knyttet til arbeidet de utfører, tar vi nærmest for gitt. Mitt sikte med denne artikkelen er å gi et innspill til nærere drøfting av hvordan det profesjonelle ansvaret kan forstås. I nyere profesjonsetiske kodekser knyttes ansvar først og fremst til konsekvenser av handlinger. Det innebærer at den profesjonelles ansvar forutsetter at det kan trekkes en linje fra en handlings konsekvens til den handlende. I komplekse organisasjoner kan imidlertid rekonstruksjon av veien fra konsekvens av (...) handling tilbake til den handlende vise seg vanskelig. Alternativt kan ansvar knyttes til spørsmål om handlingens samsvar med regler og prosedyrer. En slik tilnærming benevnes gjerne som «accountability». Disse to ulike tilnærmingene til ansvar har det til felles at det er handlingen som er i fokus – handlingens regelsamsvar eller dens konsekvenser, ikke en individuell dimensjon knyttet til den handlende som person. Den profesjonelle som selvstendig, tenkende og vurderende person blir perifer. Til videre drøfting av dette trekker jeg veksler på Hannah Arendts tenkning om ansvar. «To-i-én-dialog» og «tenkning» er sentrale elementer, og jeg vil peke på hennes bidrag som en mulig vei til en utdypet forståelse av det profesjonelle ansvarets individuelle dimensjon.Nøkkelord: profesjonelt ansvar, handlingens konsekvenser, accountability, to-i-én-dialog, tenkningEnglish summary: Individual responsibility and shallowness in professional workIt is almost taken for granted that professionals are responsible for the work they do. The scope of this article is to contribute to an evaluation of how we can understand this professional responsibility. Modern professional–ethical codes tie responsibility primarily to the consequences of acts. Thus the responsibility of a professional assumes that a connection can be drawn between the consequences of an act to the person who acted. However, in complex organizational structures, it can be difficult to find the path from consequence to actor. Another option is to look at responsibility as the product of an action's compliance with rules and procedures. Such an approach is often called «accountability». What these two different approaches to responsibility have in common is the focus on an action. It is the consequences of acts or compliance of rules that matter rather than the individual who performs the act. The idea of a professional as an autonomous, thinking and evaluating person becomes peripheral. The individual dimension of responsibility involves that the professional's responsibility goes beyond adherence to rules and procedures and what follows from tracking acts and consequences. I use Hannah Arendt's thoughts on the responsibility to facilitate further debate on this topic. A «two-in-one» dialogue and «thinking» are core elements in this, and I will point to her contribution as a possible path to a more in-depth understanding of the individual dimension of professional responsibility. (shrink)

Ny bioteknologi gir nye muligheter som har vist seg å være moralsk utfordrende. Det gjelder særlig innenfor menneskelig reproduksjon, der denne teknologien er spesielt potent. Med virkeliggjøringen av antikkens drøm om å kunne påvirke fremtidige barns egenskaper følger en rekke vanskelige valg. I analysen av og debatten om slike valg har man forsøkt å skille mellom tilvalg og fravalg med hensyn på bestemte egenskaper. Ett konkret eksempel er hvorvidt personer med Klinefelter syndrom skal tilbys assistert befruktning, og det illustrerer at (...) slike skiller kanskje ikke er så dekkende eller viktige for den etiske debatten som man kan få inntrykk av. Andre grunnleggende problemstillinger synes vel så påtrengende. Det betyr ikke at vi må forkaste seleksjonsmodellen. Eksemplet med Klinefelter syndrom stimulerer derimot til å revidere og utvikle den, og det gir føringer for hvordan modellen kan nyanseres og anvendes ut over skillet mellom tilvalg og fravalg. Denne revisjonen kan redusere seleksjonsproblematikkens polemiske kraft, men kanskje også øke dens anvendelse for etikk i praksis. (shrink)